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Abstract 
 
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence 
stable matchings for three-sided systems. 
 
Introduction: The two-sided matching model of Gale and Shapley 
(1962) can be interpreted as one where a non-empty finite set of 
firms need to employ a non-empty finite set of workers. Further, 
each firm can employ at most one worker and each worker can be 
employed by at most one firm. Each worker has preferences over 
the set of firms and each firm has preferences over the set of 
workers. An assignment of workers to firms is said to be stable if 
there does not exist a firm and a worker who prefer each other to 
the ones they are associated with in the assignment. Gale and 
Shapley (1962) proved that every two-sided matching problem 
admits at least one stable matching. 
In this paper we extend the above model by including a non-empty 
finite set of techniques. A technique can be likened to a machine 
that is owned by a technologist who is neither a firm nor a worker, 
and which the firm and worker together use for production. Further 
each technologist owns exactly one technique. Each firm has 
preferences over the set of ordered pairs of workers and 
techniques, each worker has preferences over the set of ordered 
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pairs of firms and techniques and each technologist has preferences 
over ordered pairs of firms and workers. Such models [see Alkan 
(1988)] are called three-sided systems. A matching in a three-sided 
system consists of disjoint triplets, each triplet comprising a firm, a 
worker and a technologist. A stable matching for a three-sided 
system is a matching which does not admit a triplet whose 
members are better off together than at their current designations. 
Alkan (1988) provided an example of a three-sided system that 
does not admit a stable matching. Danilov (2003) established the 
existence of a stable matching for lexicographic three-sided 
systems.  
The preference of a firm is separable if its preference over workers 
is independent of the technique and its preference over techniques 
is independent of the worker. The preference of a worker is 
separable if its preference over firms is independent of the 
technique and its preference over techniques is independent of the 
firm. A three-sided system is said to be separable if preferences of 
all firms and workers are separable. Through out the paper, we 
assume that the preferences of the workers are separable between 
firms and techniques. A special case of such preferences is 
lexicographic preferences, with firms enjoying priority over 
techniques. If in addition the preferences of the firms are 
lexicographic (without necessarily being separable), with workers 
enjoying priority over techniques, then the system is called 
lexicographic. Lexicographic systems are clearly separable. 
In this paper we show that if a three-sided system is lexicographic 
for workers and satisfies a property called Technical Specialization 
then there exists a stable matching. Technical Specialization says: 
given two distinct firm-worker pairs, the technique that is best for 
the firm in one pair is different from the technique that is best for 
the firm in the other. Note that the discrimination property is 
strictly stronger than the weak discrimination property that we 
discussed earlier. We also provide an example of a three-sided 
system with preferences of workers being both lexicographic as 
well as separable, that does not admit a stable matching. In this 
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example the preferences of the firms are neither lexicographic nor 
separable.  
Neither technical specialization nor the proof of theorem that 
establishes the existence of a stable matching when technical 
specialization is satisfied by a three-sided system, takes cognizance 
of the preferences of the technologists. In a way, the stable 
matching that is obtained may have resulted by ‘coercing’ the 
technologists. While this may make the technical specialization an 
unpalatable assumption, it is worth remembering, that a stable 
matching for a three-sided system, does not require that every side 
of the system play an active role in determining its viability. 
Alternatively one may assume that the three-sided system is 
strongly separable i.e. lexicographic for workers and separable for 
firms. In such a scenario we need to assume that the preferences of 
firms and technologists over workers are in “agreement” (i.e. given 
a firm, a technologists ranks the workers in the same way that the 
firm does) to show that a three-sided system admits a stable 
matching. Agreement over workers in a strongly separable 
environment implies some kind of a hierarchy where the worker 
cares only about the firm and forms the bottom layer, whereas the 
technologist’s preferences over the workers “echoes” the 
preferences of the firm it is engaged with.    
Following the tradition of Gale and Shapley (1962), we model our 
analysis in terms of a firm employing at most one worker. By 
present day reckoning, a firm employing at most one worker is 
usually a small road-side shop, rather than an industrial unit. 
Hence, it might appear as if our analysis has little if no relevance to 
the more common real world situations. However, it may well be a 
reasonable starting point for the cooperative theory of multi-sided 
systems. Roth and Sotomayor (1988) contain an elaborate 
discussion of matching models, where firms may employ more 
than one worker. It turns out in their analysis, that the cooperative 
theory for such firms is almost identical to the cooperative theory 
arising out of the Gale and Shapley (1962) framework. This 
occurs, since each firm can be replicated as often as the number of 
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workers it can employ, with each replica having the same 
preferences over workers as the original firm. Further, the 
preferences of the workers between replicas of two different firms 
should be exactly the same as her preferences between the 
originals. On the other hand, the non-cooperative theory where 
each firm employs more than one worker is considerably different 
from the non-cooperative theory where firms may employ at most 
one. It is noteworthy that the cooperative theory for many-to-many 
two-sided matching models does not permit the same replication 
argument. This has been shown in Lahiri (2006). 
The analysis reported in this paper, attempts at extending results 
pertaining to the existence of stable matchings in a labor market, 
by introducing technology as an essential determinant of the results 
that we obtain. Since our paper, is concerned with the cooperative 
theory of three-sided systems, the model that we use of a firm 
employing at most one worker, continues to provide valuable 
insights concerning the existence of stable matchings in labor 
markets.  
 
The Model: Let W be a non-empty finite set denoting the set of 
workers, F a non-empty finite set denoting the set of firms and T a 
non-empty finite set denoting the set of techniques. We assume for 
the sake of simplicity that the |T| cardinality of T is equal to the 
number of firms (|F|) which in turn is equal to the number of 
workers (|W|).  
Each w∈W has preference over F×T defined by a linear order (i.e. 
anti-symmetric, reflexive, complete and transitive binary relation) 
≥w whose asymmetric part is denoted >w. Each f∈F has preference 
over W×T defined by a linear order ≥f whose asymmetric part is 
denoted >f. Each t∈T has preference over F×W defined by a linear 
order ≥t whose asymmetric part is denoted >t.   
A three-sided system is given by the array [{≥f:f∈F}, {≥w:w∈W}, 
{≥t:t∈T}]. 
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A job-matching is a one-to-one function m from F to W. A 
technique matching is a one-to-one function n from F to T. 
Since F,T and W all have the same cardinality, every job-matching 
and every technique matching is of necessity a bijection. 
A pair (m,n) where m is a job-matching and n is a technique 
matching is called a matching (for the three-sided system). 
 
A matching (m,n) is said to be stable if there does not exist f∈F, 
w∈W and t∈T such that: (w,t) >f (m(f),n(f)), (f,t) >w (m-1(w), 
n(m-1(w))) and (f,w) >t (m(n-1(t), n-1(t)).  
 
A three-sided system is said to be separable for workers if for all 
w∈W there exists linear orders Pw on F and Qw on T such that for 
all (f,t), (f',t') ∈F×T: (f,t) ≥w (f',t) if and only if fPwf' and (f,t) ≥w 
(f,t') if and only if tQwt'  
A three-sided system is said to be separable for firms if for all 
f∈F there exists linear orders Pf on W and Qf on T such that for all 
(w,t), (w',t') ∈W×T: (w,t) ≥f (w',t) if and only if  wPfw' and (w,t) ≥f 
(w,t') if and only if tQft'. 
A three-sided system is said to be separable if it is separable for 
both firms and workers. 
A separable three-sided system is said to be lexicographic for 
workers if for all w∈W there exists linear orders Pw on F and Qw 
on T such that: (a) for all f,f'∈F with f ≠ f' and t,t'∈T: fPwf' implies 
(f,t) >w (f',t'); (b) for all f∈F and t,t'∈T with t ≠ t': tQwt' implies (f,t) 
>w (f,t'). 
A three-sided system is said to be lexicographic for firms if for all 
f∈F there exists linear orders Pf on W such that for all w,w'∈W 
with w ≠ w' and t,t'∈T: wPfw' implies (w,t) >f (w',t'). 
 
Note that unlike the definition of lexicographic for workers our 
definition of a three-sided system being lexicographic for firms 
does not require the system to be separable. 
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A three-sided system is said to be lexicographic if it is both 
lexicographic for workers as well as for firms. 
 
A three-sided system is said to be strongly separable if it is 
separable for firms and lexicographic for workers. 
Hence strongly separable system is separable, since by dint of it 
being lexicographic for workers it is separable for workers as well. 
 
Danilov (2003) proved that if a three-sided system is 
lexicographic, then it admits a stable matching.  
 
Existence of Stable Matchings: A three-sided system is said to 
satisfy Technical Specialization (TS) if there exists a function 
β:F× W→T such that (a) for all w,w1∈W and f,f1 ∈F with w≠w1 
and f≠f1: β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1); (b) for all w∈W, f∈F and t∈T: 
(w,β(f,w)) ≥f (w,t). 
 
Theorem 1: Suppose a three-sided system that is lexicographic for 
workers satisfies TS. Then there exists a stable matching. 
 
Proof: Suppose preferences are lexicographic for workers and the 
system satisfies TC. 
Hence for all w∈W there exists linear orders Pw on F and Qw on T 
such that: (a) for all f,f'∈F with f ≠ f' and t,t'∈T: fPwf' implies (f,t) 
>w (f',t'); (b) for all f∈F and t,t'∈T with t ≠ t': tQwt' implies (f,t) >w 
(f,t'). 
For f∈F let Pf be the linear order on W such that for all w, w'∈W: 
wPfw'  if and only if (w, β(f,w)) ≥f (w', β(f, w')). 
Consider the two-sided matching problem where the preference of 
a firm f is given by Pf, and the preference of a worker w is given 
by Pw. 
As in Gale and Shapley (1962) we get a stable job-matching m, i.e. 
for all w∈W and f∈F: either m(f)Pfw or m-1(w)Pwf. 
The technique-matching n is defined as follows: 
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For all f∈F:n(f) = β(f,m(f)). 
By TS, n is well defined. 
Suppose the matching (m,n) is not stable. Thus, there exists w∈W, 
f∈F and t∈T such that: (f,t) >w (m-1(w),n(m-1(w)), (w,t) >f (m(f), 
n(f)) and (f,w) >t ((n-1(t),m(n-1(t)).  
Let m-1(w) = f0, and n-1(t) = f1. 
Since the preferences of workers are lexicographic (with firms 
receiving priority over techniques), (f,t) >w (m-1(w),n(m-1(w)) 
implies fPwf0. 
However since m is stable, fPwf0 implies m(f)Pfw. 
Thus (m(f), n(f)) = (m(f), β(f,m(f)))≥f(w, β(f,w)).  
Clearly (w,β(f,w)) ≥f (w,t).  
Hence (m(f), β(f,m(f)))≥f (w, t), contrary to our assumption. 
Thus (m,n) is stable. Q.E.D. 
 
Note: The above proof is not valid if instead of assuming that 
preferences are lexicographic for workers, we merely assume that 
they are separable for them. The conflict arises since TC defines a 
best technique according to the preferences of the firms and not 
that of the workers. 
It is also worth noting that Theorem 1 and its proof would continue 
to remain valid if the definition of a three-sided system being 
“lexicographic for workers” had been weaker than what we insist 
in this paper. Thus if we do not insist on a three-sided system to be 
separable in order to be lexicographic for workers, the above 
theorem would continue to be valid with a minor re-wording of the 
above proof. The alternative definition of a three-sided system 
being lexicographic for workers could read as: for all w∈W there 
exists linear orders Pw on F such that for all f,f'∈F with f ≠ f' and 
t,t'∈T: fPwf' implies (f,t) >w (f',t'). 
 
The following example shows that if a three-sided system is 
merely lexicographic for workers then the existence of a stable 
matching is not guaranteed. 
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Example 1: Let W = {w1,w2}, F = {f1,f2}, T = {t1, t2}.  
Assume that the system is lexicographic for workers with both w1 
and w2 preferring t1 to t2 for any given firm f. Suppose that both w1 
and w2 prefer f1 to f2.  
Suppose f1 prefers (w2,t1) to (w1, t1) to (w1,t2) to (w2,t2) and f2 
prefers (w1,t1) to (w2,t1) to (w2,t2) to (w1, t2). 
Suppose that t1 prefers (f2,w1) to (f1,w2) to (f2,w2) to (f1,w1) and t2 
prefers (f1,w1) to (f1,w2).  
  
Let us consider the following four matchings: 
(1) {(f1 ,w1 ,t1), (f2 ,w2 ,t2)}; 
(2) {(f1 ,w1 ,t2), (f2 ,w2 ,t1)}; 
(3) {(f2 ,w1 ,t1), (f1 ,w2 ,t2)}; 
(4) {(f2 ,w1 ,t2), (f1 ,w2 ,t1)}.   
Matching (1) is blocked by (f2, w2, t1) since w2 prefers (f2,t1) to 
(f2,t2), f2 prefers (w2, t1) to (w2, t2) and t1 prefers (f2,w2) to (f1,w1). 
Matching (2) is blocked by (f1, w2,t1) since w2 prefers (f1,t1) to 
(f2,t1), f1 prefers (w2,t1) to (w1,t2) and t1 prefers (f1,w2) to (f2,w2). 
Matching (3) is blocked by (f1,w1,t2) since w1 prefers (f1,t2) to 
(f2,t2), f1 prefers (w1,t2) to (w2,t2) and t2 prefers (f1,w1) to (f1,w2). 
Matching (4) is blocked by (f2,w1,t1) since w1 prefers (f2,t1) to 
(f2,t2), f2 prefers (w1,t1) to (w1,t2) and t1 prefers (f2,w1) to (f1,w2). 
Hence none of the four matchings are stable.  
Further, β(f1,w2) = β(f2,w1) = t1. This contradicts TS. 
 
It is worth noting that TS is not necessary for the existence of a 
stable matching for a three-sided system, as the following example 
reveals. 
 
Example 2: Let W = {w1,w2,w3}, F= {f1,f2,f3} and T = {t1,t2,t3}. 
Suppose that for each w∈W there exists a linear order Pw on F 
satisfying f1Pwf2Pwf3 and for each f∈F there exists a linear order Pf 
on W satisfying w1Pfw2Pfw3. Suppose for each w∈W there exists a 
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linear order Qw on T and for each f∈F there exists a linear order Qf 
on T. Suppose t1Qa t2 Qa t3  for a ∈{f1, w1,w2} and t3Qa t2 Qa t1 for a 
∈{w3, f2,f3}. Further suppose that for all w,w'∈W, f,f' ∈F and 
t,t'∈T with w≠w', f≠f' and t≠t': (a) (w,t) >f (w',t') if and only if 
wPfw1; (b) (w,t) >f (w,t') if and only if tQft'; (c) (f,t) >w (f',t') if and 
only if fPwf'; (d) (f,t) >w (f,t') if and only if tQwt'. 
In addition suppose that for all t∈T, f'∈F, w'∈W and i∈{1,2,3}: 
(fi,wi) ≥t (f',w') if and only if t = ti. 
Towards a contradiction suppose that this system satisfies TS. 
Then there exists a function β:F× W→T such that (a) for all 
w,w'∈W and f,f' ∈F with w≠w' and f≠f':β(f,w) ≠ β(f',w'); (b) for all 
w∈W and f∈F: [(w,β(f,w)) ≥f (w,t) for all t∈T]. Thus, β(f1,w1) = t1 
and β(f3,w3) = t3. Since β(f2,w2) ∈ {t1,t3}, the requirements of TS 
are violated. Thus this system does not satisfy TS.  
However, the matching with the associated triplets being (wi,fi,ti) 
for i = 1,2,3 is indeed a stable matching.  
 
A three-sided system [{≥f:f∈F}, {≥w:w∈W}, {≥t:t∈T}] is said to 
satisfy Agreement over Workers if for f∈F, t∈T and w'∈W: (w,t) 
>f (w', t) implies (f,w) >t (f, w'). 
 
Theorem 2: Suppose a three-sided system is strongly separable 
(i.e. separable for firms and lexicographic for workers) and 
satisfies Agreement over Workers. Then there exists a stable 
matching. 
 
Proof: Suppose that for all w∈W, there exists linear orders Pw on F 
and Qw on T such that: (a) for all f,f'∈F with f ≠ f' and t,t'∈T: fPwf' 
implies (f,t) >w (f',t'); (b) for all f∈F and t,t'∈T with t ≠ t': tQwt' 
implies (f,t) >w (f,t'). 
Suppose in addition that for all f∈F, there exists a linear order Pf 
on W and Qf on T such that for all w,w'∈F with w ≠ w' and t,t'∈T 
with t ≠ t': wPfw' implies (w,t) >f (w',t) and tPft' implies (w,t) >f 
(w,t'). 
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Consider the two-sided matching model based on F and W where 
for each f∈F and w∈W, preferences are given by Pf and Pw 
respectively. As in Gale and Shapley (1962), we get a job-
matching m that is stable, i.e. for all w∈W and f∈F: either m(f)Pfw 
or m
-1(w)Pwf. 
For t∈T, let Pt be a linear order on F such that for all f,f'∈F with f 
≠ f': fPtf' if and only if (f, m(f)) >t (f', m(f')). 
Consider the two-sided matching model based on F and T where 
for each f∈F and t∈T, preferences are given by Qf and Pt 
respectively. As in Gale and Shapley (1962), we get a technique-
matching n such that for all t∈T and f∈F: either n(f)Qft or n-1(t)Ptf. 
Towards a contradiction suppose that the matching (m,n) is not 
stable. 
Thus, there exists w∈W, f∈F and t∈T such that: (f,t) >w (m-1(w), 
n(m-1(w))), (w,t) >f (m(f), n(f)) and (f,w) >t (n-1(t), m(n-1(t))). 
Since the preferences of workers are lexicographic with firms 
receiving priority over techniques, it must be either (a) f = m-1(w) 
and tQw n(m-1(w)) or (b) fPwm-1(w).  
Suppose f = m-1(w). 
Thus, tQw n(m-1(w)). 
Since preferences of firms are separable we must have tQfn(f). 
tQfn(f) and the stability of the matching n implies (n-1(t), m(n-1(t))) 
>t (f,m(f)). 
Thus, (f, w) >t (f, m(f)). 
This contradicts w = m(f).  
Hence suppose fPwm-1(w). By the stability of the matching m, we 
must have m(f)Pfw.  
Since preferences of firms are separable given (w,t) >f (m(f), n(f)), 
the fact that we have m(f)Pfw implies tQfn(f). 
tQfn(f) and the stability of the matching n implies (n-1(t), m(n-1(t))) 
>t (f,m(f)). 
Thus, (f, w) >t (f, m(f)). 
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Since the three-sided system is assumed to satisfy agreement over 
workers and the preferences of firms are separable, (f, w) >t (f, 
m(f)) implies wPfm(f), contradicting m(f)Pfw as obtained earlier. 
Thus (m,n) is stable. Q.E.D.  
 
In example 1 the preferences of the workers are lexicographic 
(with firms getting priority over technologists), but the preferences 
of the firms are not separable. Thus although the three-sided 
system satisfies agreement over workers, it does not admit a stable 
matching. 
 
In the following example preferences are strongly separable but the 
system does not satisfy agreement over workers and does not admit 
a stable matching. 
 
Example 3: Let W = {w1,w2}, F = {f1,f2}, T = {t1, t2}.  
Assume that the system is lexicographic for workers (with firms 
receiving priority over technologists). Suppose that for any given 
firm both workers prefer t2 to t1 and that both workers prefer f1 to 
f2.  
Suppose the preferences of the firms are also lexicographic 
(although not in the sense that we have defined in this paper), with 
technologists receiving priority over workers. Hence the 
preferences of the firms are separable. Suppose both firms prefer t2 
to t1 and for any given technique prefer w2 to w1.  
Suppose t1 prefers (f1, w2) to (f1, w1). 
Suppose t2 prefers (f2,w2) to (f1, w1) and (f1,w1) to (f2, w1) to 
(f1,w2). 
  
Let us consider the following four matchings: 
(1) {(f1 ,w1 ,t1), (f2 ,w2 ,t2)}; 
(2) {(f1 ,w1 ,t2), (f2 ,w2 ,t1)}; 
(3) {(f2 ,w1 ,t1), (f1 ,w2 ,t2)}; 
(4) {(f2 ,w1 ,t2), (f1 ,w2 ,t1)}.   
 12 
Matching (1) is blocked by (f1, w2, t1) since w2 prefers (f1,t1) to 
(f2,t2), f1 prefers (w2, t1) to (w1, t1) and t1 prefers (f1,w2) to (f1,w1). 
Matching (2) is blocked by (f2, w2,t2) since w2 prefers (f2,t2) to 
(f2,t1), f2 prefers (w2,t2) to (w2,t1) and t2 prefers (f2,w2) to (f1,w1). 
Matching (3) is blocked by (f2,w1,t2) since w1 prefers (f2,t2) to 
(f2,t1), f2 prefers (w1,t2) to (w2,t1) and t2 prefers (f2,w1) to (f1,w2). 
Matching (4) is blocked by (f1,w1,t2) since w1 prefers (f1,t2) to 
(f2,t2), f1 prefers (w1,t2) to (w2,t1) and t2 prefers (f1,w1) to (f2,w1). 
Hence none of the four matchings are stable. 
Note that given t2, f1 prefers w2 to w1, whereas given f1, t2 prefers 
w1 to w2. 
Hence the system does not satisfy agreement over workers.  
 
It is instructive to note that in example 3, although the preferences 
of the workers and firms are both lexicographic (although not in 
the sense in which it is defined here) with workers giving priority 
to firms over techniques, a stable matching does not exist, since 
firms accord priority to techniques over workers. The reciprocation 
of priority between firms and workers that was assumed by 
Danilov (2003) is absent in example 3. 
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